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Abstract—We introduce an automated parameterized verifi-
cation method for fault-tolerant distributed algorithms (FTDA).
FTDAs are parameterized by both the number of processes and
the assumed maximum number of Byzantine faulty processes. At
the center of our technique is a parametric interval abstraction
(PIA) where the interval boundaries are arithmetic expressions
over parameters. Using PIA for both data abstraction and a
new form of counter abstraction, we reduce the parameterized
problem to finite-state model checking. We demonstrate the
practical feasibility of our method by verifying several variants
of the well-known distributed algorithm by Srikanth and Toueg.
Our semi-decision procedures are complemented and motivated
by an undecidability proof for FTDA verification which holds
even in the absence of interprocess communication. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first paper to achieve parameterized
automated verification of Byzantine FTDA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Parameterized Model Checking. In its original formula-
tion [16], Model Checking was concerned with efficient pro-
cedures for the evaluation of a temporal logic specification ϕ
over a finite Kripke structure K , i.e., decision procedures
for K |= ϕ. Since K can be extremely large, a multitude
of logic-based algorithmic methods including symbolic verifi-
cation [43], [8] and predicate abstraction [32] were developed
to make this decidable problem tractable for practical applica-
tions. Finite-state models are, however, not always an adequate
modeling formalism for software and hardware:
(i) Infinite-state models. Many programs and algorithms
are most naturally modeled by unbounded variables such as
integers, lists, stacks etc. Modern model checkers are using
predicate abstraction [32] in combination with SMT solvers
to reduce an infinite-state model I to a finite state model h(I)
that is amenable to finite state model checking. The construc-
tion of h assures soundness, i.e., for a given specification
logic such as ACTL∗, we can assure by construction that
h(I) |= ϕ implies I |= ϕ. The major drawback of abstraction
is incompleteness: if h(I) 6|= ϕ then it does in general not
follow that I 6|= ϕ. (Note that ACTL∗ is not closed un-
der negation.) Counterexample-guided abstraction refinement
(CEGAR) [14], [7] addresses this problem by an adaptive
procedure, which analyzes the abstract counterexample for
h(I) 6|= ϕ on h(I) to find a concrete counterexample or obtain
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a better abstraction h′(I). For abstraction to work in practice,
it is crucial that the abstract domain from which h and h′ are
chosen is tailored to the problem class and possibly the speci-
fication. Abstraction thus is a semi-decision procedure whose
usefulness has to be demonstrated by practical examples.
(ii) An orthogonal modeling and verification problem is
parameterization: Many software and hardware artifacts are
naturally represented by an infinite class of structures K =
{K1,K2, . . . } rather than a single structure. Thus, the verifi-
cation question is ∀iKi |= ϕ, where i is called the parameter.
In the most important examples of this class, the parameter
i is standing for the number of replications of a concurrent
component, e.g., the number of processes in a distributed
algorithm, or the number of caches in a cache coherence
protocol. It is easy to see that even in the absence of con-
currency, parameterized model checking is undecidable [5];
more interestingly, undecidability even holds for networks of
constant size processes arranged in a ring with a single token
for communication [51], [26]. Although several approaches
have been made to identify decidable classes for parameterized
verification [26], [24], [54], no decidable formalism has been
found which covers a reasonably large class of interesting
problems. The diversity of problem domains for parameterized
verification and the difficulty of the problem gave rise to
many approaches including regular model checking [2] and
abstraction [45], [15] — the method discussed in this paper.
Again, the challenge in abstraction is to find an abstraction
h(K) such that h(K) |= ϕ implies Ki |= ϕ for all i.
Most previous research on parameterized model checking
focused on concurrent systems with n+c processes where n is
the parameter and c is a constant: n of the processes are iden-
tical copies; c processes represent the non-replicated part of
the system, e.g., cache directories, shared memory, dispatcher
processes etc. [31], [35], [44], [15]. Most of the work on
parameterized model checking considers only safety. Notable
exceptions are [37], [45] where several notions of fairness are
considered in the context of abstraction to verify liveness.
Fault-tolerant Distributed Algorithms. In this paper, we are
addressing the problem of parameterized verification of fault-
tolerant distributed algorithms (FTDA). This work is part of
an interdisciplinary effort by the authors to develop a tool
basis for the automated verification, and, in the long run,
deployment of FTDAs [36], [38]. FTDAs constitute a core
topic of the distributed algorithms community with a rich
body of results [41], [6]. FTDAs are more difficult than the
standard setting of parameterized model checking because a
certain number t of the n processes can be faulty. In the case
of e.g. Byzantine faults, this means that the faulty processes
can send messages in an unrestricted manner. Importantly, the
upper bound t for the faulty processes is also a parameter, and
is essentially a fraction of n. The relationship between t and n
is given by a resilience condition, e.g., n > 3t. Thus, one has
to reason about all systems with n−f non-faulty and f faulty
processes, where f ≤ t and n > 3t.
From a more operational viewpoint, FTDAs typically con-
sist of multiple processes that communicate by message pass-
ing over a completely connected communication graph. Since
a sender can be faulty, a receiver cannot wait for a message
from a specific sender process. Therefore, most FTDAs use
counters to reason about their environment. If, for instance, a
process receives a certain message m from more than t distinct
processes, it can conclude that one of the senders is non-faulty.
A large class of FTDAs expresses these counting arguments
using threshold guards:
if received <m> from t+1 distinct processes
then action(m);
Note that threshold guards generalize existential and uni-
versal guards [24], i.e., rules that wait for messages from at
least one or all processes, respectively. As can be seen from
the above example, and as discussed in [36], existential and
universal guards are not sufficient to capture advanced FTDAs.
Contribution. We consider parameterized verification of FT-
DAs with threshold guards and resilience conditions. We start
by introducing a framework based on a new form of control
flow automata that captures the semantics of threshold-guarded
fault-tolerant distributed algorithms. Based on this framework,
we show that the parameterized model checking problem
under consideration is undecidable, even for FTDAs without
interprocess communication and without arithmetic operations.
Thus, we are led to propose a novel two-step abstraction
technique. Both steps are based on parametric interval ab-
straction (PIA), a generalization of interval abstraction where
the interval borders are parameters rather than constants. Using
the PIA domain, we obtain a finite-state model checking
problem in two steps:
Step 1: PIA data abstraction. We evaluate the threshold
guards over the parametric intervals. Thus, we abstract away
unbounded variables and parameters from the process code.
We obtain a parameterized system where the replicated pro-
cesses are finite-state and independent of the parameters.
Step 2: PIA counter abstraction. We use a new form of
counter abstraction where the process counters are abstracted
to PIA. As Step 1 guarantees that we need only finitely many
counters, PIA counter abstraction yields a finite-state system.
It is interesting to note that the intermediate model obtained
by Step 1 still falls in the undecidable class obtained above.
To evaluate the precision of our abstractions, we im-
plemented our abstraction technique in a tool chain, and
conducted experiments on several FTDAs. Our experiments
showed the need for abstraction refinement to deal with spuri-
ous counterexamples [14]. We encountered spurious behaviors
that are due to parameterized abstraction and fairness; this
required novel refinement techniques, which we also discuss in
this paper. In addition to refinement of PIA counter abstraction,
which is automated in a loop using a model checker and
an SMT solver, we are also exploiting simple user-provided
invariant candidates to refine the abstraction similar to the
CMP method [44], [52].
Thus, we are able to verify several variants of the
well-known distributed broadcast algorithm by Srikanth and
Toueg [48], [49] in the Byzantine setting as well as the
(simpler) algorithm verified by Fisman et al. [29]. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to achieve
parameterized automated verification of Byzantine FTDA.
Related work. Traditionally, correctness of FTDAs was shown
by handwritten proofs [41], [6], and, in some cases, by proof
assistants [40], [47], [12], [39]. Completely automated model
checking or synthesis methods are usually not parameter-
ized [53], [50], [9]. Our work stands in the tradition of
parameterized model checking for protocols [10], [31], [25],
[45], [15], i.e., for mutual exclusion, cache coherence etc. In
particular, the techniques by Pnueli et al. [45], namely, counter
abstraction and justice preservation are keystones of our work.
The first work that addresses parameterized model checking
of FTDA uses regular model checking [3], [2], and was
conducted by Fisman et al. [29]. They model a parameterized
system consisting of n processes as a transducer, which
translates a global state — modeled as a word of length n—
into the next global state of the same length. Consequently,
their models are limited to processes whose local state space
and transition relation are finite, fixed, and independent of
parameters, in particular, of n in their case. Such models
were sufficient to verify a folklore reliable broadcast algorithm
RBC (cf. e.g., [11]) that tolerates crash faults, and where every
process stores whether it has received at least one message.
However, these models are not sufficient to capture more
involved FTDAs that contain threshold guards as in our case.
Moreover, as [29] explain, the presence of a resilience
condition such as n > 3t would require them to intersect the
regular languages which describe sets of states with context-
free languages which enforce the resilience condition.
Our framework captures the RBC algorithm, and more
advanced algorithms that use threshold guards over parameters
and resilience conditions.
To the best of our knowledge, the current paper is the first
in which a distributed algorithm that tolerates Byzantine faults
has been automatically verified for all system sizes and all
admissible numbers of faulty processes.
Our technique applies to FTDAs, which are an important
aspect of distributed systems, but by far not the only one.
While there is other work in the verification and synthesis
of distributed systems, they do not focus on algorithmic
verification of safety and liveness properties for fault tolerant
distributed algorithms. In this broader class of distributed
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systems literature, the work by Abdulla and Johnson [1] and
Mayr [42] appears most closely related to ours because they
address faults. However, their “lossy systems” contain very
different fault assumptions, which are not part of the problem
class we consider here.
Regarding our abstraction technique, an abstract domain
similar to PIA was developed in [46]. It was used in the
framework of abstract interpretation [18], and was developed
as a generalization of the polyhedra domain. Starting from
a similar domain, [46] is thus taking a direction that is
substantially different from parameterized model checking.
Let us conclude the introduction with a note on terminology:
Fault-tolerant broadcast protocols are distributed algorithms
which achieve reliable all-to-all communication on top of
(partially) unreliable communication, or in the presence of
processes that may send conflicting information to different
processes. This notion of “broadcast” should not be confused
with broadcast systems where the computational model con-
tains broadcast primitives that ensure that processes can send
information to all others, as e.g., in [28].
II. SYSTEM MODEL WITH MULTIPLE PARAMETERS
We define the parameters, local variables of the processes,
and shared variables referring to a single domain D that is
totally ordered and has the operations addition and subtraction.
In this paper we will assume that D = N0.
We start with some notation. Let Y be a finite set of
variables ranging over D. We will denote by D|Y |, the set of
all |Y |-tuples of variable values. In order to simplify notation,
given s ∈ D|Y |, we use the expression s.y, to refer to the
value of a variable y ∈ Y in vector s. For two vectors of
variable values s and s′, by s =X s′ we denote the fact that
for all x ∈ X , s.x = s′.x holds.
Process. The set of variables V is {sv} ∪ Λ ∪ Γ ∪ Π: The
variable sv is the status variable that ranges over a finite set
SV of status values. The finite set Λ contains variables that
range over the domain D. The variable sv and the variables
from Λ are local variables. The finite set Γ contains the shared
variables that range over D. The finite set Π is a set of
parameter variables that range over D, and the resilience
condition RC is a predicate over D|Π|. In our example,
Π = {n, t, f}, and the resilience condition RC(n, t, f) is
n > 3t ∧ f ≤ t ∧ t > 0. Then, we denote the set of
admissible parameters by PRC = {p ∈ D|Π| | RC(p)}.
A process operates on states from the set S = SV×D|Λ|×
D|Γ| ×D|Π|. Each process starts its computation in an initial
state from a set S0 ⊆ S. A relation R ⊆ S × S defines
transitions from one state to another, with the restriction
that the values of parameters remain unchanged, i.e., for all
(s, t) ∈ R, s =Π t. Then, a parameterized process skeleton is
a tuple Sk = (S, S0, R).
We get a process instance by fixing the parameter values
p ∈ D|Π|: one can restrict the set of process states to S|p =
{s ∈ S | s =Π p} as well as the set of transitions to R|p =
R∩(S|p×S|p). Then, a process instance is a process skeleton
Sk|p = (S|p, S0|p, R|p) where p is constant.
System Instances. For fixed admissible parameters p, a dis-
tributed system is modeled as an asynchronous parallel com-
position of identical processes Sk|p. The number of processes
depends on the parameters. To formalize this, we define the
size of a system (the number of processes) using a function
N : PRC → N0, for instance, when modeling only correct
processes explicitly, n− f for N(n, t, f).
Given p ∈ PRC , and a process skeleton Sk = (S, S0, R),
a system instance is defined as an asynchronous parallel
composition of N(p) process instances, indexed by i ∈
{1, . . . , N(p)}, with standard interleaving semantics. Let AP
be a set of atomic propositions. A system instance Inst(p,Sk)
is a Kripke structure (SI , S0I , RI ,AP, λI) where:
• The set of (global) states is SI = {(σ[1], . . . , σ[N(p)]) ∈
(S|p)
N(p) | ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N(p)}, σ[i] =Γ∪Π σ[j]}.
Informally, a global state σ is a Cartesian product of
the state σ[i] of each process i, with identical values of
parameters and shared variables at each process.
• S0I = (S
0)N(p) ∩ SI is the set of initial (global) states,
where (S0)N(p) is the Cartesian product of initial states
of individual processes.
• A transition (σ, σ′) from a global state σ ∈ SI to a global
state σ′ ∈ SI belongs to RI iff there is an index i, 1 ≤
i ≤ N(p), such that:
– (MOVE) The i-th process moves: (σ[i], σ′[i]) ∈ R|p.
– (FRAME) The values of the local variables of the
other processes are preserved: for every process
index j 6= i, 1 ≤ j ≤ N(p), it holds that
σ[j] ={sv}∪Λ σ
′[j].
• λI : SI → 2
AP is a state labeling function.
Remark 1: The set of global states SI and the transition
relation RI are preserved under every transposition i ↔ j
of process indices i and j in {1, . . . , N(p)}. That is, every
system Inst(p,Sk) is fully symmetric by construction.
Remark 2: We call a pair of resilience condition and system
size function (RC, N) natural if {N(p) | RC(p)} is infinite.
From now on we consider only families of system instances
with natural (RC, N), as this implies that there is no bound
on the number of processes.
Atomic Propositions. We define the set of atomic proposition
AP to be the disjoint union of APSV and APD. The set APSV
contains propositions that capture comparison against a given
status value Z ∈ SV, i.e., [∀i. svi = Z] and [∃i. svi = Z].
Further, the set of atomic propositions APD captures com-
parison of variables x, y, and a linear combination c of
parameters from Π; APD consists of propositions of the form
[∃i. xi + c < yi] and [∀i. xi + c ≥ yi].
The labeling function λI of a system instance Inst(p,Sk)
maps a state σ to expressions p from AP as follows (the
existential case is defined accordingly using disjunctions):
[∀i. svi = Z] ∈ λI(σ) iff
∧
1≤i≤N(p)
(σ[i].sv = Z)
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[∀i. xi + c ≥ yi] ∈ λI(σ) iff∧
1≤i≤N(p)
(σ[i].x+ c(p) ≥ σ[i].y)
Temporal Logic. We specify properties using formulas of tem-
poral logic LTL
-X over APSV . We use the standard definitions
of paths and LTL
-X semantics [13]. A formula of LTL-X is
defined inductively as: (i) a literal p or ¬p, where p ∈ APSV ,
or (ii) Fϕ, Gϕ, ϕUψ, ϕ∨ψ, and ϕ∧ψ, where ϕ and ψ are
LTL
-X formulas.
Fairness. We are interested in verifying safety and liveness
properties. The latter can be usually proven only in the
presence of fairness constraints. As in [37], [45], we consider
verification of safety and liveness in systems with justice
fairness constraints. We define fair paths of a system instance
Inst(p,Sk) using a set of justice constraints J ⊆ APD. A
path π of a system Inst(p,Sk) is J-fair iff for every p ∈ J
there are infinitely many states σ in π with p ∈ λI(σ). By
Inst(p,Sk) |=J ϕ we denote that the formula ϕ holds on all
J-fair paths of Inst(p,Sk).
Definition 3 (PMCP): Given a parameterized system de-
scription containing
• a domain D,
• a parameterized process skeleton Sk = (S, S0, R),
• a resilience condition RC (generating a set of admissible
parameters PRC ),
• a system size function N ,
• justice requirements J ,
and an LTL
-X formula ϕ, the parameterized model checking
problem (PMCP) is to verify
∀p ∈ PRC . Inst(p,Sk) |=J ϕ.
III. THRESHOLD-GUARDED FAULT-TOLERANT
DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHMS
A. Framework for FTDAs
We give a formalization that is adequate for threshold-
guarded FTDAs, and suitable for verification. It captures
threshold guards as discussed in Section I as a core primitive.
FTDAs are usually described in steps that consist of a loop-
free sequence of small steps.
Further, we model faults (e.g., Byzantine) that have the
effect that correct processes receive more or less messages than
actually should have been sent. We model the send operation
by an increase of a global variable, and the receive by a
non-deterministic choice that captures faults and asynchrony
in communication. By this, we model the effect of faulty
processes rather than modeling them explicitly. The soundness
of the modeling approach requires involved arguments dis-
cussed in [36]. These arguments are in the area of distributed
computing theory and out of scope of the current paper.
To address all these issues, we propose a variant of control
flow automata. Henzinger et al. [33] introduced CFA as a
framework to describe the control flow of a program, using
a graph where the edges are labeled with instructions.
qI
q1
q2
q3
q4
sv = V1
sv 6= V1∧
nsnt0 = nsnt∧
sv0 = sv
nsnt0 = nsnt + 1
sv0 = SE
q5
q6
q7
q8
q9
qF
rcvd ≤ rcvd′ ∧ rcvd′ ≤ nsnt + f
(t+ 1 > rcvd′)∧
sv′ = sv0 ∧
nsnt′ = nsnt0
t+ 1 ≤ rcvd′
sv0 = V0
sv0 6= V0∧
nsnt′ = nsnt0
nsnt′ = nsnt0 + 1
n− t > rcvd′
n− t ≤ rcvd′
sv′ = SE
sv′ = AC
Fig. 1. CFA of our case study for
Byzantine faults.
qI
q1
q2q3
q4
q5
qF
rcvd ≤ rcvd′ ∧
rcvd′ ≤ nsnt + nsntf
sv = V1sv = V0
sv = AC
sv = CR
1 > rcvd′
1 ≤ rcvd′
sv′ = CR
nsntf ′ =
nsntf + 1
sv′ = AC
nsnt′ =
nsnt + 1
Fig. 2. CFA of FTDA from [29]
(if x′ is not assigned, then x′ = x).
Formally, a guarded control flow automaton (CFA) is an
edge-labeled directed acyclic graph A = (Q, qI , qF , E) with
a finite set Q of nodes called locations, an initial location
qI ∈ Q, and a final location qF ∈ Q. A path from qI to qF
is used to describe one step of a distributed algorithm. The
edges have the form E ⊆ Q × guard × Q, where guard is
defined as an expression of one of the following forms where
a0, . . . , a|Π| ∈ Z, and Π = {p1, . . . , p|Π|}:
• if Z ∈ SV , then sv = Z and sv 6= Z are status guards;
• if x is a variable in D and ⊳ ∈ {≤, >}, then
a0 +
∑
1≤i≤|Π|
ai · pi ⊳ x
is a threshold guard;
• if y, z1, . . . , zk are variables in D for k ≥ 1, and ⊳ ∈
{=, 6=, <, ≤, >,≥}, and a0, . . . , a|Π| ∈ Z, then
y ⊳ z1 + · · ·+ zk +
(
a0 +
∑
1≤i≤|Π|
ai · pi
)
is a comparison guard;
• a conjunction g1 ∧ g2 of guards g1 and g2 is a guard.
Status guards are used to capture the basic control flow.
Threshold guards capture the core primitive of the FTDAs we
consider. Finally, comparison guards are used to model send
and receive operations.
Obtaining a Skeleton from a CFA. One step of a process
skeleton is defined by a path from qI to qF in a CFA. Given
SV, Λ, Γ, Π, RC, and a CFA A, we define the process skeleton
Sk(A) = (S, S0, R) induced by A as follows: The set of
variables used by the CFA is W ⊇ Π ∪ Λ ∪ Γ ∪ {sv} ∪ {x′ |
x ∈ Λ ∪ Γ ∪ {sv}}.
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Informally, a variable x corresponds to the value before a
step and the variable x′ to the value after the step. A path p
from qI to qF of CFA induces a conjuction of all the guards
along it. We call a mapping v from W to the values from
the respective domains a valuation. We may write v |= p to
denote that the valuation v satisfies the guards of the path p.
We are now in the position to define the mapping between
a CFA A and the transition relation of a process skeleton
Sk(A): If there is a path p and a valuation v with v |= p,
then v defines a single transition (s, t) of a process skeleton
Sk(A), if for each variable x ∈ Λ ∪ Γ ∪ {sv} it holds that
s.x = v(x) and t.x = v(x′) and for each parameter variable
z ∈ Π, s.z = t.z = v(z).
Finally, to specify S0, all variables of the skeleton that range
over D are initialized to 0, and sv ranging over SV takes an
initial value from a fixed subset of SV.
Remark 4: It might seem restrictive that our guards do not
contain, e.g., increment, assignments, non-deterministic choice
from a range of values. However, all these statements can be
translated in our form using the SSA transformation algorithm
from [19]. For instance, Figure 1 has been obtained from a
CFA (given in the appendix in Figure 4) that contains the
mentioned statements.
Definition 5 (PMCP for CFA): We define the Parameter-
ized Model Checking Problem for CFA A by specializing
Definition 3 to the parameterized process skeleton Sk(A).
B. Undecidability of PMCP for CFA
We call a CFA where all guards are status guards a non-
communicating CFA. In this section we argue that the problem
from Definition 5 is undecidable even if the CFA is non-
communicating.1
The outline of the proof is similar to the undecidability
proofs in [31], [26]: one of the processes plays the role
of a control process that simulates the program of a two
counter machine (2CM), and the other processes are data
processes that each store at most one digit of one of the
two counters encoded in unary representation. The control
processes increments or decrements a counter by a handshake
with a data process. In system instances that contain n data
processes, this is sufficient to simulate n steps of a 2CM. If the
parameterized model checking problem under consideration is
defined for a natural (RC, N), then for arbitrarily many steps
there is some system instance that simulates at least that many
steps of the 2CM. Undecidability of the parameterized model
checking problem then follows from the undecidability of the
non-halting problem for 2CMs.
Esparza [27] has shown that test for zero statements of a
2CM can be simulated with a temporal logic specification
using an atomic proposition “test for zero”. Given the proof
strategies from [31], [26], the only technical difficulty that
remains is to ensure a handshake between non-communicating
CFAs. We do so by enforcing a handshake using sequences of
status values the CFAs go through, and an LTL
-X specification
1The detailed construction and proof are given in Appendix A.
which acts as a scheduler that ensures a specific interleaving
between the updates of the status variables of the two CFAs.
Theorem 6: Let M be a two counter machine, and (RC, N)
be a natural pair of resilience condition and system size
function. One can efficiently construct a non-communicating
CFA A(M) and an LTL
-X property ϕnonhalt(M) such that the
following two statements are equivalent:
• M does not halt.
• ∀p ∈ PRC , Inst(p,Sk(A)) |=∅ ϕnonhalt(M).
Corollary 7: PMCP for CFAs is undecidable even if CFAs
contain status guards only.
As discussed in Section III-A, we model faults by the
influence they have on values of variables in the domain D.
As we do not restrict the set of local and global variables, the
result also applies if these sets are non-empty. Moreover, in
this kind of modeling, the atomic propositions [∃i. svi = Z]
range over correct processes only. Hence, the undecidability
result also holds for FTDAs. If one chooses to model faults
differently, i.e., by changing the transition relation of a process,
then the decidability depends on the way the transition relation
is modified. For instance, certain problems are decidable
in lossy systems [1], [42]. However, lossy systems are not
suitable for modeling the FTDAs we consider.
Notwithstanding this undecidability results, the rest of the
paper is concerned with abstraction techniques for threshold-
based FTDA. In this context, Corollary 7 shows that the
model checking problem we obtain after the first abstraction
step (mentioned in the introduction) is still undecidable. As
discussed in the introduction, abstraction always has to be
accompanied by a case study along with practical experiments.
C. Case Study
The distributed algorithm by Srikanth and Toueg [48], [49]
is one of the most basic distributed algorithms that has appli-
cations in a wide area of distributed computing. It is a basic
building block that has been used in various environments
(degrees of synchrony, fault assumptions, etc.) and many other
more complicated distributed algorithms, such as consensus
[23], [4], software and hardware clock synchronization [48],
[30], approximate agreement [22], and k-set agreement [21].
Figure 1 shows the guarded control flow automaton of the core
of Srikanth and Toueg’s algorithm.
In our experiments we consider additional three algorithms
that are based on similar algorithmic ideas.2 They deal with
different fault models and resilience conditions; the algorithms
are: (BYZ), which is the algorithm from Figure 1, for t
Byzantine faults if n > 3t, (SYMM) for t symmetric (identical
Byzantine [6]) faults if n > 2t, (OMIT) for t send omission
faults if n > 2t, and (CLEAN) for t clean crash faults if
n > t. For comparison with the results by Fisman et al. [29],
we also verified the RBC algorithm whose CFA is given in
Figure 2. In this paper we verify the following safety and
2Their CFA is given in Figure 5 in the appendix.
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liveness specifications for the algorithms: 3
[∀i. svi 6= V1]→G [∀j. svj 6= AC] (U)
[∀i. svi = V1]→F [∃j. svj = AC] (C)
G (¬ [∃i. svi = AC])∨ F [∀j. svj = AC] (R)
However, from the literature we know that we cannot expect
to verify these FTDAs without putting additional constraints
on the environment, e.g., communication fairness, i.e., every
message sent is eventually received. To capture this, we use
justice requirements, e.g., J = {[∀i. rcvdi ≥ nsnt]} in the
Byzantine case.
IV. ABSTRACTION SCHEME
The input to our abstraction method is the infinite param-
eterized family F = {Inst(p,Sk(A)) | p ∈ PRC} of Kripke
structures specified via a CFA A. The family F has two
principal sources of unboundedness: unbounded variables in
the process skeleton Sk(A), and the unbounded number of
processes N(p). We deal with these two aspects separately,
using two abstraction steps, namely the PIA data abstraction
and the PIA counter abstraction. In both abstraction steps we
use the parametric interval abstraction PIA that we introduce
in Section IV-A.
A. Abstract Domain of Parametric Intervals (PIA)
Given a CFA A, let GA be the set of all linear combinations
a0+
∑
1≤i≤|Π| ai ·pi that are met in the left-hand sides of A’s
threshold guards. Every expression ε of GA defines a function
fε : PRC → D. Let T = {0, 1} ∪ {fε | ε ∈ GA} be a
finite threshold set of cardinality µ+ 1. For convenience, we
name elements of T as ϑ0, ϑ1, . . . , ϑµ with ϑ0 corresponding
to the constant function 0, and ϑ1 corresponding to the
constant function 1. For instance, the CFA in Figure 1 has
the threshold set {ϑ0, ϑ1, ϑ2, ϑ3}, where ϑ2(n, t, f) = t + 1
and ϑ3(n, t, f) = n− t.
Then, we define the domain of parametric intervals:
D̂ = {Ij | 0 ≤ j ≤ µ}
Our abstraction rests on an implicit property of many fault-
tolerant distributed algorithms, namely, that the resilience
condition RC induces an order on the thresholds used in the
algorithm (e.g., t+ 1 < n− t). Assuming such an order does
not limit the application of our approach: In cases where only
a partial order is induced by RC, one can simply enumerate all
finitely many total orders. As parameters, and thus thresholds,
are kept unchanged in a run, one can verify an algorithm for
each threshold order separately, and then combine the results.
We may thus restrict the threshold sets we consider by:
Definition 8: The finite set T is uniformly ordered if for all
p ∈ PRC , and all ϑj(p) and ϑk(p) in T with 0 ≤ j < k ≤ µ,
it holds that ϑj(p) < ϑk(p).
3In addition, for the RBC algorithm, we also verified the specification,
which was verified in [29] (called A in Table I)
Definition 8 allows us to properly define the parameterized
abstraction function αp : D → D̂ and the parameterized
concretization function γp : D̂ → 2D.
αp(x) =
{
Ij if x ∈ [ϑj(p), ϑj+1(p)[ for some 0 ≤ j < µ
Iµ otherwise.
γp(Ij) =
{
[ϑj(p), ϑj+1(p)[ if j < µ
[ϑµ(p),∞[ otherwise.
From ϑ0(p) = 0 and ϑ1(p) = 1, it immediately follows
that for all p ∈ PRC , we have αp(0) = I0, αp(1) = I1, and
γp(I0) = {0}. Moreover, from the definitions of α, γ, and
Definition 8 one immediately obtains:
Proposition 9: For all p in PRC , and for all a in D, it
holds that a ∈ γp(αp(a)).
Definition 10: Ik ≤ Iℓ iff k ≤ ℓ.
The PIA domain has similarities to predicate abstraction
since the interval borders are naturally expressed as predicates,
and computations over PIA are directly reduced to SMT
solvers. However, notions such as the order of Definition 10
are not naturally expressed in terms of predicate abstraction.
B. PIA data abstraction
Our parameterized data abstraction is based on two abstrac-
tion ideas. First, the variables used in a process skeleton are
unbounded and we have to map those unbounded variables to
a fixed-size domain. If we fix parameters p ∈ PRC , then an
interval abstraction [18] is a natural solution to the problem of
unboundedness. Second, we want to produce a single process
skeleton that does not depend on parameters p ∈ PRC and
captures the behavior of all process instances. This can be
done by using ideas from existential abstraction [17], [20],
[37] and sound abstraction of fairness constraints [37]. Our
contribution consists of combining these two ideas to arrive at
parametric interval data abstraction.
Our abstraction maps values of unbounded variables to
parametric intervals Ij , whose boundaries are symbolic expres-
sions over parameters. This abstraction differs from interval
abstraction [18] in that the interval bounds are not numeric.
However, for every instance, the boundaries are constant
because the parameters are fixed. We hence do not have to
deal with symbolic ranges over variables in the sense of [46].
We now discuss an existential abstraction of a formula Φ
that is either a threshold or a comparison guard (we consider
other guards later). To this end we introduce notation for
sets of vectors satisfying Φ. According to Section III-A,
formula Φ has two kinds of free variables: parameter variables
from Π and data variables from Λ ∪ Γ. Let xp be a vector
of parameter variables (xp1, . . . , x
p
|Π|) and x
v be a vector
of variables (xv1 , . . . , xvk) over Dk. Given a k-dimensional
vector d of values from D, by
xp = p,xv = d |= Φ
we denote that Φ is satisfied on concrete values xv1 =
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d1, . . . , x
v
k = dk and parameter values p. We define:
||Φ||E = {dˆ ∈ D̂
k | ∃p ∈ PRC∃d = (d1, . . . , dk) ∈ D
k.
dˆ = (αp(d1), . . . , αp(dk)) ∧ x
p = p,xv = d |= Φ}
Hence, ||Φ||E contains all vectors of abstract values that
correspond to some concrete values satisfying Φ. Note care-
fully, that parameters do not appear anymore due to existential
quantification. A PIA existential abstraction of Φ is defined
to be a formula Φˆ over a vector of variables xˆ = xˆ1, . . . , xˆk
over D̂k such that {dˆ ∈ D̂k | xˆ = dˆ |= Φˆ} ⊇ ||Φ||E .
Computing PIA abstractions. The central property of our
abstract domain is that it allows to abstract comparisons
against thresholds (i.e., threshold guards) in a precise way.
That is, we can abstract formulas of the form ϑj(p) ≤ x1 by
Ij ≤ xˆ1 and ϑj(p) > x1 by Ij > xˆ1. In fact, this abstraction
is precise in the following sense.
Proposition 11: For all p ∈ PRC and all a ∈ D:
ϑj(p) ≤ a iff Ij ≤ αp(a), and ϑj(p) > a iff Ij > αp(a).
For all comparison guards we are going to use a general
form (well-known from the literature), namely:
ΦˆE =
∨
(dˆ1,...,dˆk)∈||Φ||E
xˆ1 = dˆ1 ∧ · · · ∧ xˆk = dˆk
Proposition 12: If Φ is a formula over variables x1, . . . , xk
over D, then ΦˆE is a PIA existential abstraction.
If the domain D̂ is small (as it is in our case), then one
can enumerate all vectors of abstract values in D̂k and check
which belong to our abstraction ||Φ||E , using an SMT solver.
Transforming CFA. We now describe a general method to ab-
stract guard formulas, and thus construct an abstract process
skeleton. To this end, we denote by αE a mapping from a
concrete formula Φ to some existential abstraction of Φ (not
necessarily constructed as above). By fixing αE , we can define
an abstraction of a guard of a CFA:
abst(g) =

αE(g) if g is a threshold guard
αE(g) if g is a comparison guard
g if g is a status guard
abst(g1) ∧ abst(g2) otherwise, i.e., g is g1 ∧ g2
By slightly abusing the notation, for a CFA A by abst(A)
we denote the CFA that is obtained from A by replacing every
guard g with abst(g). Note that abst(A) contains only guards
over sv and over abstract variables over D̂.
Definition 13: We define a mapping hdatp from valuations v
of a CFA A to valuations vˆ of CFA abst(A) as follows:
for each variable x over D, vˆ.x = αp(v.x), and for each
variable y over SV , vˆ.y = v.y.
The following theorem follows immediately from the defi-
nition of existential abstraction and abst(A):
Theorem 14: For all guards g, all p in PRC , and for all
valuations v with v =Π p: if v |= g, then hdatp (v) |= abst(g).
For model checking purposes we have to reason about the
Kripke structures that are built using the skeletons obtained
from CFAs. We denote by Skabs(A), the process skele-
ton that is induced by CFA abst(A). Analogously to hdatp ,
we define the parameterized abstraction mapping h¯datp that
maps global states from Inst(p,Sk(A)) to global states from
Inst(p,Skabs(A)). After that, we obtain Theorem 16 from
Theorem 14 and the construction of system instances.
Definition 15: Let σ be a state of Inst(p,Sk(A)), and σˆ
be a state of the abstract instance Inst(p,Skabs(A)). Then,
σˆ = h¯datp (σ) if for each variable y ∈ Λ∪Γ∪Π, σˆ.y = αp(σ.y),
and σˆ.sv = σ.sv.
Theorem 16: For all p ∈ PRC , and for all CFA A, if
system instance Inst(p,Sk(A)) = (SI , S0I , RI ,AP, λI) and
system instance Inst(p,Skabs(A)) = (SIˆ , S0Iˆ , RIˆ ,AP, λIˆ),
then: if (σ, σ′) ∈ RI , then (h¯datp (σ), h¯datp (σ′)) ∈ RIˆ .
Theorem 16 is the first step to prove simulation. In order
to actually do so, we now define the labeling function λ
Iˆ
. For
propositions from p ∈ APSV , λIˆ(σˆ) is defined in the same way
as λI . Similarly to [37] for propositions from p ∈ APD, which
are used in justice constraints, we define:
[∃i. xi + c < yi] ∈ λIˆ(σˆ) iff∨
1≤i≤N(p)
σˆ[i] |= αE({x+ c(p) < y})
[∀i. xi + c ≥ yi] ∈ λIˆ(σˆ) iff∧
1≤i≤N(p)
σˆ[i] |= αE({x+ c(p) ≥ y})
From Theorem 16, the definition of h¯datp with respect to the
variable sv, and the definition of λ
Iˆ
, one immediately obtains
the following theorems. Theorem 18 ensures that justice
constraints J in the abstract system Inst(p,Skabs(A)) are a
sound abstraction of justice constraints J in Inst(p,Sk(A)).
Theorem 17: For all p ∈ PRC , and for all CFA A, it holds
Inst(p,Sk(A))  Inst(p,Skabs(A)), with respect to APSV .
Theorem 18: Let π = {σi}i≥1 be a J-fair path of
Inst(p,Sk(A)). Then πˆ = {h¯datp (σi)}i≥1 is a J-fair path of
Inst(p,Skabs(A)).
C. PIA counter abstraction
In this section, we present a counter abstraction inspired
by [45] which maps a system instance composed of identical
finite state process skeletons to a single finite state system.
We use the PIA domain D̂ along with abstractions αE({x′ =
x+ 1}) and αE({x′ = x− 1}) for the counters.
Let us consider a process skeleton Sk = (S, S0, R), where
S = SV×D˜|Λ|×D˜|Γ|×D˜|Π| that is defined using an arbitrary
finite domain D˜. (Note that we do not require that the skeleton
is obtained from a CFA.) Our counter abstraction over the
abstract domain D̂ proceeds in two stages, where the first stage
is only a change in representation, but not an abstraction.
Stage 1: Vector Addition System with States (VASS). Let
L = {ℓ ∈ SV × D˜|Λ| | ∃s ∈ S. ℓ ={sv}∪Λ s} be the set
of local states of a process skeleton. As the domain D˜ and
the set of local variables Λ are finite, L is finite. We write
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the elements of L as ℓ1, . . . , ℓ|L|. We define the counting
function K : SI × L → D such that K(σ, ℓ) is the number
of processes i whose local state is ℓ in global state σ, i.e.,
σ[i] ={sv}∪Λ ℓ. Thus, we represent the system state σ ∈ SI
as a tuple (g1, . . . , gk,K[σ, ℓ1], . . . ,K[σ, ℓ|L|]), i.e., by the
shared global state and by the counters for the local states. If a
process moves from local state ℓi to local state ℓj , the counters
of ℓi and ℓj will decrement and increment, respectively.
Stage 2: Abstraction of VASS. We abstract the counters K
of the VASS representation using the PIA domain to obtain
a finite state Kripke structure C(Sk). To compute C(Sk) =
(SC, S
0
C, RC,AP, λC) we proceed as follows:
A state w ∈ SC is given by values of shared vari-
ables from the set Γ, ranging over D˜|Γ|, and by a vector
(κ[ℓ1], . . . , κ[ℓ|L|]) over the abstract domain D̂ from Sec-
tion IV-A. More concisely, SC = D̂|L| × D˜|Γ|.
Definition 19: The parameterized abstraction mapping h¯cntp
maps a global state σ of the system Inst(p,Sk) to a state w
of the abstraction C(Sk) such that: For all ℓ ∈ L it holds that
w.κ[ℓ] = αp(K[σ, ℓ]), and w =Γ σ.
From the definition, one can see how to construct the initial
states. Informally, we require (1) that the initial shared states
of C(Sk) correspond to initial shared states of Sk, (2) that
there are actually N(p) processes in the system, and (3) that
initially all processes are in an initial state.
The intuition4 for the construction of the transition relation
is as follows: Like in VASS, a step that brings a process from
local state ℓi to ℓj can be modeled by decrementing the (non-
zero) counter of ℓi and incrementing the counter of ℓj . Like
Pnueli, Xu, and Zuck [45] we use the idea of representing
counters in an abstract domain, and performing increment and
decrement using existential abstraction. They used a three-
valued domain representing 0, 1, or more processes. As we
are interested, e.g., in the fact whether at least t + 1 or
n − t processes are in a certain state, the domain from [45]
is too coarse for us. Therefore, we use counters from D̂,
and we increment and decrement counters using the formulas
αE({x
′ = x+ 1}) and αE({x′ = x− 1}).
Theorem 20: For all p ∈ PRC , and all finite state
process skeletons Sk, let system instance Inst(p,Sk) =
(SI , S
0
I , RI ,AP, λI), and C(Sk) = (SC, S0C, RC,AP, λC).
Then: if (σ, σ′) ∈ RI , then
(
h¯cntp (σ), h¯
cnt
p (σ
′)
)
∈ RC.
To prove simulation, we now define the labeling func-
tion λC. Here we consider propositions from APD∪APSV in the
form of [∃i. Φ(i)] and [∀i. Φ(i)]. Formula Φ(i) is defined over
variables from the |Π|-dimensional vector xp of parameters,
a k-dimensional vector xℓ of local variables and sv, an m-
dimensional vector of global variables xg . Then, the labeling
function is defined by
[∃i. Φ(i)] ∈ λC(w) if and only if∨
ℓ∈L
(
xℓ =Λ ℓ,x
g =Γ w |= abst(Φ(i)) ∧w.k[ℓ] 6= I0
)
4A formal definition of the transition relation is given in Appendix C.
[∀i. Φ(i)] ∈ λC(w) if and only if∧
ℓ∈L
(
xℓ =Λ ℓ,x
g =Γ w |= abst(Φ(i)) ∨ w.k[ℓ] = I0
)
Theorem 21: For all p ∈ PRC , and for all finite state
process skeletons Sk, Inst(p,Sk)  C(Sk), w.r.t. APSV .
Theorem 22: If π = {σi}i≥1 is a J-fair path of Inst(p,Sk),
then the path πˆ = {h¯cntp (σi)}i≥1 is a J-fair path of C.
From Theorems 17, 18, 21, 22, and [13, Thm. 16] we obtain
the following central corollary in the form necessary for our
parameterized model checking problem.
Corollary 23 (Soundness of data & counter abstraction):
For all CFA A, and for all formulas ϕ from LTL
-X over APSV
and justice constraints J ⊆ APD: if C(Skabs(A)) |=J ϕ, then
for all p ∈ PRC it holds Inst(p,Sk(A)) |=J ϕ.
V. ABSTRACTION REFINEMENT
Due to our parametric existential abstraction of comparison
guards, which may be imprecise, we have to deal with several
kinds of spurious behavior.
The first one is caused by spurious transitions. Consider
a transition τ of C(Skabs(A)). We say that the transition τ
is spurious w.r.t. p ∈ PRC , if there is no transition in
Inst(p,Sk(A)) that is a concretization of τ . This situation can
be detected by known techniques [14] for a fixed p. However,
it is not sound to remove τ from C(Skabs(A)), unless τ is
spurious w.r.t. all p ∈ PRC . We call transitions that are
spurious w.r.t. all admissible parameters uniformly spurious.
Detecting such transitions is a challenge and to the best of
our knowledge, this problem has not been investigated before.
To detect such transitions, we use one more intermediate
abstraction in the form of VASS that abstracts local variables
as in Section IV-B and keeps concrete shared variables and
process counters.
Independently of uniformly spurious transitions, parametric
abstraction leads to the second interesting problem. Consider
transitions τ1 and τ2 of C(Skabs(A)) that are not spurious
w.r.t. p1 and p2 in PRC , respectively, for p1 6= p2. It can
be the case that a path τ1, τ2 is in C(Skabs(A)) and there
is no p3 ∈ PRC such that the concretization of τ1, τ2 is a
path in Inst(p3,Sk(A)), i.e., the path τ1, τ2 is uniformly spu-
rious. We detect such spurious behavior by invariants. These
invariants are provided by the user as invariant candidates, and
then automatically checked to actually be invariant using an
SMT solver.
As observed by [45], counter abstraction may lead to justice
suppression. Given a counter-example in the form of a lasso,
we detect whether its loop contains only unjust states. If
this is the case, we refine C(Skabs(A)) by adding a justice
requirement, which is consistent with existing requirements
in all concrete instances Inst(p,Sk(A)). This refinement is
similar to an idea from [45].
Below, we give a general framework for a sound refinement
of C(Skabs(A)).5
5In the appendix, we provide techniques that allow us to do refinement in
practice in Sections E-A and E-B.
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To simplify presentation, we define a monster sys-
tem as a (possibly infinite) Kripke structure Sysω =
(Sω, S
0
ω, Rω,AP, λω), whose state space and transition rela-
tion are disjoint unions of state spaces and transition relations
of system instances Inst(p,Sk(A)) = (Sp, S0p, Rp,AP, λp)
over all admissible parameters:
Sω =
⋃
p∈PRC
Sp, S
0
ω =
⋃
p∈PRC
S0p, Rω =
⋃
p∈PRC
Rp
λω : Sω → 2
AP and ∀p ∈ PRC , ∀s ∈ Sp. λω(s) = λp(s)
Using abstraction mappings h¯datp and h¯cntp we define an ab-
straction mapping h¯dc : Sω → SC from Sysω to C(Skabs(A)):
If σ ∈ Sp, then h¯dc(σ) = h¯cntp (h¯datp (σ)).
Definition 24: A sequence T = {σi}i≥1 is a concretization
of path Tˆ = {wi}i≥1 from C(Skabs(A)) if and only if σ1 ∈ S0ω
and for all i ≥ 1 it holds h¯dc(σi) = wi.
Definition 25: A path Tˆ of C(Skabs(A)) is a spurious path
iff every concretization T of Tˆ is not a path in Sysω.
While for finite state systems there are methods to detect
whether a path is spurious [14], we are not aware of a method
to detect whether a path Tˆ in C(Skabs(A)) corresponds to a
path in the (concrete) infinite monster system Sysω. Therefore,
we limit ourselves to detecting and refining uniformly spurious
transitions and unjust states.
Definition 26: An abstract transition (w,w′) ∈ RC is uni-
formly spurious iff there is no transition (σ, σ′) ∈ Rω with
w = h¯dc(σ) and w′ = h¯dc(σ′).
Definition 27: An abstract state w ∈ SC is unjust under
q ∈ APD iff there is no concrete state σ ∈ Sω with w = h¯dc(σ)
and q ∈ λω(σ).
We give a general criterion that ensures soundness of
abstraction, when removing uniformly spurious transitions. In
other words, removing a transition does not affect the property
of transition preservation.
Theorem 28: Let T ⊆ RC be a set of spurious transitions.
Then for every transition (σ, σ′) ∈ Rω there is a transition
(h¯dc(σ), h¯dc(σ′)) in RC \ T .
From the theorem it follows that the system Cref =
(SC, S
0
C, RC \ T,AP, λC) still simulates Sysω.
After the criterion of removing individual transitions, we
now consider infinite counterexamples of C(Skabs(A)), which
have a form of lassos w1 . . . wk(wk+1 . . . wm)ω. For such a
counterexample Tˆ we denote the set of states in the lasso’s
loop by U . We then check, whether all states of U are unjust
under some justice constraint q ∈ J . If this is the case, Tˆ is
a spurious counterexample, because the justice constraint q is
violated. Note that it is sound to only consider infinite paths,
where states outside of U appear infinitely often; in fact, this
is a justice requirement. To refine C’s unjust behavior we add
a corresponding justice requirement. Formally, we augment J
(and APD) with a propositional symbol [off U ]. Further, we
augment the labelling function λC such that every w ∈ SC is
labelled with [off U ] if and only if w ∈ U .
Theorem 29: Let J ⊆ APD be a set of justice requirements,
q ∈ J , and U ⊆ SC be a set of unjust states under q. Let
M |= ϕ? RC Spin Spin Spin Spin #R Total
Time Memory States Depth Time
Byz |= U (A) 2.2 s 83 MB 483k 9154 0 3 s
Byz |= C (A) 2.6 s 87 MB 614k 12966 6 18 s
Byz |= R (A) 6.6 s 101 MB 1122k 14820 8 21 s
Sym |= U (A) 0.1 s 68 MB 18k 897 0 1 s
Sym |= C (A) 0.1 s 68 MB 19k 1221 3 5 s
Sym |= R (A) 0.2 s 69 MB 40k 1669 8 12 s
Omt |= U (A) 0.1 s 68 MB 4k 487 0 1 s
Omt |= C (A) 0.1 s 68 MB 6k 627 3 9 s
Omt |= R (A) 0.1 s 68 MB 8k 704 5 9 s
Cln |= U (A) 0.3 s 68 MB 30k 1371 0 2 s
Cln |= C (A) 0.3 s 68 MB 35k 2043 6 10 s
Cln |= R (A) 1.1 s 69 MB 51k 2647 20 60 s
RBC |= U — 0.1 s 68 MB 0.8k 232 0 1 s
RBC |= A — 0.1 s 68 MB 1.7k 333 0 1 s
RBC |= R — 0.1 s 68 MB 1.2k 259 0 1 s
RBC 6|= C — 0.1 s 68 MB 0.8k 232 0 2 s
Byz 6|= U (B) 7.2 s 168 MB 3160k 23120 12 85 s
Byz 6|= C (B) 3.2 s 100 MB 1123k 17829 6 28 s
Byz 6|= R (B) 0.4 s 71 MB 136k 6387 9 23 s
Byz |= U (C) 4.0 s 103 MB 1192k 11073 0 5 s
Byz |= C (C) 8.9 s 175 MB 3781k 36757 19 104 s
Byz 6|= R (C) 3.0 s 110 MB 1451k 24656 43 165 s
Sym 6|= U (B) 0.1 s 68 MB 31k 1503 1 1 s
Sym 6|= C (B) 0.1 s 68 MB 32k 1837 3 3 s
Sym |= R (B) 0.2 s 69 MB 54k 2161 6 16 s
Omt |= U (D) 0.1 s 68 MB 6k 544 0 1 s
Omt 6|= C (D) 0.1 s 68 MB 6k 544 0 2 s
Omt 6|= R (D) 0.1 s 68 MB 0.1k 481 0 4 s
TABLE I
EXPERIMENTAL DATA ON ABSTRACTION OF ALGORITHMS TOLERANT TO
FAULTS: BYZANTINE, SYMMETRIC, OMISSION, CLEAN CRASHES. RBC
CORRESPONDS TO THE RELIABLE BROADCAST ALGORITHM ALSO
CONSIDERED IN [29]. CHECKED UNDER DIFFERENT RESILIENCE
CONDITIONS (RC): (A) n > 3t ∧ f ≤ t; (B) n > 3t ∧ f ≤ t+ 1; (C)
n ≥ 3t ∧ f ≤ t; (D) n ≥ 2t ∧ f ≤ t. RBC WORKS FOR n ≥ t ≥ f . RUN
ON A 3.3GHZ INTEL R© CORETM 4GB MACHINE.
π = {σi}i≥1 be an arbitrary fair path of Sysω under J . The
path πˆ = {h¯dc(σi)}i≥1 is a fair path in C(Skabs(A)) under
J ∪ {[off U ]}.
From this we derive that loops containing only unjust states
can be eliminated, and thus C(Skabs(A)) be refined.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To show practicability of the abstraction, we have im-
plemented the PIA abstractions and the refinement loop in
OCaml as a prototype tool BYMC. We evaluated it on the
algorithms and the specifications discussed in Section III-C,
and conducted experiments that are summarized in Table I.
We extended the PROMELA language [34] with constructs
to express Π, AP, RC, and N . BYMC receives a description of
a CFA A in this extended PROMELA, and then syntactically
extracts the thresholds. The tool chain uses the Yices SMT
solver for existential abstraction, and generates the counter
abstraction C(Skabs(A)) in standard Promela, such that we
can use Spin to do finite state model checking. Finally, BYMC
also implements the refinements introduced in Section V and
refines the Promela code for C(Skabs(A)) by introducing
predicates capturing spurious transitions and unjust states.
The column “#R” gives the numbers of refinement steps.
In the cases where it is greater than zero, refinement was
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necessary, and “Spin Time” refers to the SPIN running time
after the last refinement step.
In the cases (A) we used resilience conditions as provided
by the literature, and verified the specification. The model
RBC represents the reliable broadcast algorithm also consid-
ered in [29].
In the bottom part of Table I we used different resilience
conditions under which we expected the algorithms to fail.
The cases (B) capture the case where more faults occur than
expected by the algorithm designer, while the cases (C) and
(D) capture the cases where the algorithms were designed by
assuming wrong resilience conditions. We omit (CLEAN) as
the only sensible case n = t = f (all processes are faulty)
results into a trivial abstract domain of one interval [0,∞).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a novel technique to model check fault-
tolerant distributed algorithms. To this end, we extended the
standard setting of parameterized model checking to processes
which use threshold guards, and are parameterized with a
resilience condition. As a case study we have chosen the
core of several broadcasting algorithms under different failure
models, including the one by Srikanth and Toueg [49] that
tolerates Byzantine faults. These algorithms are widely applied
in the literature: typically, multiple (possibly an unbounded
number of) instances are used in combination. As future work,
we plan to use compositional model checking techniques [44]
for parameterized verification of such algorithms.
Acknowledgments. We are grateful to Javier Esparza for valu-
able discussions on decidability of VASS.
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APPENDIX A
UNDECIDABILITY OF LIVENESS PROPERTIES
In this section we show that the non-halting problem
of a two counter machine (2CM) is reducible to the pa-
rameterized model checking problem as defined above, that
is, using a parameter n, a CFA A to construct an in-
stance Inst(n+ 1,Sk(A)), an LTL
-X formula that uses G ,
F , and atomic propositions [∃i. svi = Z]. We show that
Inst(n+ 1,Sk(A)) simulates at least n steps of the 2CM,
and that therefore the general parameterized model checking
problem as formulated in Section II is undecideable. Note that
G , F , and [∃i. svi = Z] are required to express the liveness
property (R) of our FTDA.
The CFA A contains the functionalities of a control process
that simulates the program of the 2CM, as well as of data
processes that each store at most one digit of one of the
two counters B and C encoded in unary representation. For
simplicity of presentation, we say that if a data process does
not store a digit for B or C, then it stores a digit for a
counter D. Counter D thus serves as a capacity (initially set
to n), from which B and C can borrow (and return) digits,
that is, initially all data processes’ status variable corresponds
to D. Our CFA A uses only the status variable sv, while the
sets of local and global variables can be empty. We consider
paths where exactly one process plays the role of the control
process, and the remaining n processes are data processes.
This can be encoded using G , F , and [∃i. svi = Z].
Intuitively, whenever the control process has to increase or
decrease the value of a counter, this is done by a handshake
of the control with a data process; up to this point, our proof
follows ideas from [31], [26], [27]. In contrast to these papers,
however, our system model does not provide primitives for
such a handshake, which leads to the central contribution for
our proof: we “move” this handshake into the specification
without using the “next time” operator not present in LTL
-X.
In addition, as in [27], also the test for zero is moved into the
specification using our propositions ¬[∃i. svi = Z]. We start
with some preliminary definitions.
A two counter machine (2CM) M is a list of m+ 1 state-
ments over two counters B and C. A statement at location v
uses a counter C(v) ∈ {B,C} and has one of the following
forms (note, that the machine halts at location m):
v : inc C(v); goto w (1)
v : if C(v) = 0 then goto w′ (2)
else dec C(v); goto w′′ (3)
m : halt (4)
The control flow of the machine M is defined by the
labelled graph (V , E , C), where V = {v | 0 ≤ v ≤ m} is
the set of locations, E = E+ ∪ E0 ∪ E− ∪ {m,m} is the set of
edges, and C : V → {B,C} is the labelling function which
maps a location to the counter used in this location. The sets
E+, E0, E− are defined as follows:
• E+ = {(v, w) | statement at v goes to w as in (1)};
qI qI
qv,w1 q
v,w
2 q
v,w
3 r
x,y
1 r
x,y
2 r
x,y
3
qF qF
sv = (v, v, IdlC )
sv = (v, w, SynC )
sv = (v, w,AckC )
sv′ = (v, w, SynC )
sv′ = (v, w,AckC )
sv′ = (w,w, IdlC )
sv = (x, x, IdlD)
sv = (x, y, SynD)
sv = (x, y,AckD)
sv′ = (x, y, SynD)
sv′ = (x, y,AckD)
sv′ = (y, y, IdlD)
Fig. 3. CFA J(v, w) for (v, w) ∈ E+ and I(x, y) for inc y (and dec x).
• E0 = {(v, w
′) | statement at v goes to w′ as in (2)};
• E− = {(v, w
′′) | statement at v goes to w′′ as in (3)}.
In what follows, we model a handshake between the control
process and a data process in order to implement an increment
as in (1) or decrement as in (3). The handshake is guaranteed
by a combination of steps both in the control and the data
processes and by a constraint formulated in LTL
-X as follows.
We define the set SVC of status values of the control process
and the set SVD be the set of status values of a data process:
SVC =
⋃
v,w∈V
{(v, v, IdlC ), (v, w, SynC ), (v, w,AckC )}
SVD =
⋃
x,y∈{B,C,D}
{(x, x, IdlD), (x, y, SynD), (x, y,AckD)
For each (f, t, h) ∈ SVC ∪ SVD, f is the state before a
handshake, t is the scheduled state after a handshake, and h
is the status of the handshake.
Consider an edge (v, w) ∈ E+ and x = D and y = C(v),
that is, in location v the counter C(v) is incremented, and
then the control goes to location w. Incrementing the counter
is done by a handshake during which the control process goes
from v to w, while a data process goes from D (the capacity)
to C(v).
To do so, we construct two CFAs J(v, w) and I(x, y)
shown in Figure 3: J(v, w) goes from location v of M to
location w in three steps SynC → AckC → IdlC , whereas
I(x, y) transfers one digit from counter x to counter y in steps
SynD → AckD → IdlD . To actually enforce the handshake
synchronization, we add the following formula HS (v, w, x, y)
that must hold in every state of a system instance:
[∃k.svk = (x, y, SynD)] →[∃k.svk = (v, w, SynC )] ∧ (5)
[∃k.svk = (x, y,AckD)] →¬[∃k.svk = (x, y, SynD)]∧ (6)
[∃k.svk = (x, y,AckD)] →[∃k.svk = (v, w,AckC )] ∧ (7)
[∃k.svk = (w,w, IdlC ] →(¬[∃k.svk = (x, y, SynD)]
¬[∃k.svk = (x, y,AckD)]) (8)
In what follows, we will consider the union of CFAs, where
union is defined naturally as the union of the sets of nodes and
the union of the sets of edges (note that the CFAs are joint at
the initial node qI , and the final node qF ).
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We are now ready to prove the central result: Let M be a
system of K processes Inst(K,Sk(J(v, w) ∪ I(x, y))) and σ0
be a global state of M such that
σ1[1].sv = (v, v, IdlC ) and
σ1[k].sv = (x, x, IdlD) for all 2 ≤ k ≤ K .
The constraints (5)-(8) impose a synchronization behavior:
Proposition 30: Let π be an infinite path {σi}i≥1 of M
starting with σ1. If π |= GHS (v, w, x, y), then there exists an
index ℓ such that 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ K and
σ7[1].sv = (w,w, IdlC )
σ7[ℓ].sv = (y, y, IdlD)
σ7[k].sv = (x, x, IdlD) for 2 ≤ k ≤ K, k 6= ℓ.
Proof: We consider all states in the prefix σ1, . . . σ7. To
prove the proposition, it is sufficient to show that the prefix
σ1, . . . σ7 is as follows for some process ℓ such that 2 ≤ ℓ ≤
K:
step σi[1] σi[ℓ] σi[k], k 6= ℓ
σ1 1 (v, v, IdlC ) (x, x, IdlD) (x, x, IdlD )
σ2 ℓ (v, w, SynC ) (x, x, IdlD) (x, x, IdlD )
σ3 1 (v, w, SynC ) (x, y, SynD) (x, x, IdlD )
σ4 ℓ (v, w,AckC ) (x, y, SynD) (x, x, IdlD )
σ5 ℓ (v, w,AckC ) (x, y,AckD) (x, x, IdlD )
σ6 1 (v, w,AckC ) (y, y, IdlD) (x, x, IdlD )
σ7 (w,w, IdlC ) (y, y, IdlD) (x, x, IdlD )
Now we show that other possible executions contradict to
the lemma’s hypothesis. Recall that a single step of a process
corresponds to a path of its CFA from qI to qF .
State σ1. By the hypothesis of the lemma.
State σ2. As data processes are blocked in σ1 by (5), only
process 1 can move.
State σ3. Suppose by contradiction that process 1 makes a step
in σ2. Then σ′3[1] = (v, w,AckC ). In such a σ′3, process 1 is
blocked by (8), and the other processes are blocked by (5). It
follows that no process can make a further step, and π cannot
be infinite, which provides the required contradiction. Hence,
there is some data process ℓ which makes the step.
State σ4. In σ3 process ℓ is blocked by (7). Further, suppose by
contradiction that data process k 6= ℓ makes a step resulting
in σ′4[k] = (x, y, SynD). Then due to (5), in σ′4, process 1
is blocked. Moreover, due to (6), processes ℓ and k are also
blocked in σ′4. It follows that in the path starting with σ′4,
all data processes move from (x, x, IdlD ) to (x, y, SynD). As
we have finitely many processes, eventually all data processes
will stop at (x, y, SynD). In this state, every process will be
blocked by (5) and (6). This contradicts the assumption that
π is infinite.
State σ5. In σ4 every process k > 1 different from ℓ is blocked
by the same argument as in state σ3 (they all eventually group
and are blocked in (x, y, SynD)). Process 1 cannot move due
to (8).
State σ6. In σ5 process 1 cannot move by (8). As process 1
resides in (v, w,AckC )— and thus not in (v, w, SynC )— by
(5), every data process k > 1 different from ℓ is blocked.
State σ7. In σ6, every data process k > 1 different from ℓ
is blocked due to (5), as process 1 resides at (v, w,AckC ).
Process ℓ cannot move because6 its CFA contains no guard
sv = (y, y, IdlD).
Using J(v, w) and I(x, y) we can simulate (1) for (v, w) ∈
E+ by instantiating J(v, w) and I(D, C(v)). Moreover, we can
simulate (3) for (v, w′′) ∈ E− by instantiating J(v, w′′) and
I(C(v), D). Finally, we can simulate (2) for (v, w′) ∈ E0 (that
is, the test for zero) by instantiating J(v, w′) and adding one
more temporal constraint EQ0 (v, w′):
[∃k.svk = (v, w′, SynC )] → ¬[∃k.svk = (C(v), C(v), IdlD)]
Now we can construct the CFA A(M) that simulates M.
This CFA is a union of CFAs constructed for edges of E . If
QJ =
⋃
(v,w)∈E
J(v, w),
then
A(M) = QJ ∪
⋃
(v,w)∈E+
I(D, C(v)) ∪
⋃
(v,w)∈E−
I(C(v), D).
Further we define a specification which ensures that there
is always exactly one control process, CP , as∧
q∈QJ
∧
q′∈QJ\{q}
¬[∃k. svk = q] ∨ ¬[∃k. svk = q′]
We specify the non-halting property ϕnonhalt as follows:
G
(
¬[∃k.svk = (m,m, IdlC )]
)
∨
F¬
(
CP ∧
∧
(v,w)∈E0
EQ0 (v, w) ∧
∧
(v,w)∈E+∪E−
HS(v, w, C(v), C(v))
)
We can specify two initial process states: One is where the
process stays in svC = (ℓ0, ℓ0, IdlC ); Another one is where
the process svD = (D,D, IdlD). Then SV0 = {svC , svD}.
Theorem 6. Let M be a two counter machine, and (RC, N)
be a natural pair of resilience condition and system size
function. One can efficiently construct a non-communicating
CFA A(M) and an LTL
-X property ϕnonhalt(M) such that the
following two statements are equivalent:
• M does not halt.
• ∀p ∈ PRC , Inst(p,Sk(A)) |=∅ ϕnonhalt(M).
APPENDIX B
CFAS OF FTDA
In this section we give examples of the CFAs we use for
our experiments in Figure 4 and 5. They have been formalized
as discussed in [36]. In the body of the current paper, we use
6In a proof for the composition of several such automata, one would apply
HS and (5) for different counters to obtain the same conclusion.
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qI
q1
q2
q3
q4
sv = V1
¬(sv = V1) inc nsnt
sv := SE
q5
q6
q7
q8
q9
qF
rcvd := ε where rcvd ≤ ε ∧ ε ≤ nsnt + f
¬(t+ 1 ≤ rcvd)
t+ 1 ≤ rcvd
sv = V0
¬(sv = V0)
inc nsnt
n− t ≤ rcvd
¬(n− t ≤ rcvd)
sv := SE
sv := AC
Fig. 4. Example CFA of a FTDA as formalized in [36].
slightly different CFA definitions, namely without increments,
assignments, and non-deterministic choice from a range of
values.
Using the algorithm from [19], the CFA in Figure 1 is
obtained from the CFA in Figure 4: In contrast to the original
CFA from Figure 4, for the CFA in Figure 1 in every path
from qI to qF , each variable appears at most once in the left-
hand side for every assignment in the original CFA. Every
variable x has several copies: x for the initial value, x′ for the
final one, and x1, x2, . . . for intermediate ones.
APPENDIX C
DETAILS OF THE COUNTER ABSTRACTION
1) Initial states.: Let L0 be a set {ℓ | ℓ ∈ L ∧ ∃s0 ∈
S0. ℓ ={sv}∪Λ s0}; it captures initial local states. Then w0 ∈
S0C if and only the following conditions are met:
∃p ∈ PRC ∃k1 · · · ∃k|L|.
∑
1≤i≤|L|
ki = N(p)∧
∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ |L|. αp(ki) = w0.κ[ℓi]
∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ |L|. (ℓi 6∈ L0)→ (w0.κ[ℓi] = I0)
∃s0 ∈ S0. w0 =Γ s0
Less formally: Concrete counter values are mapped to
w0.κ[ℓi] using αp; We consider only combinations of counters
that give a system size N(p); Every counter κ[ℓi] is initialized
to zero, if the local state ℓi is met in no initial state s0 ∈ S0;
a shared variable g of w0 may be initialized to a value v only
if there is some initial state s0 ∈ S0 with s0.g = v.
2) Transition relation.: We now formalize the transition
relation RC of C(Sk). The formal definition of when for
two states w and w′ of the counter abstraction it holds that
(w,w′) ∈ RC is given below in (9) to (18). We will discuss
each of these formulas separately. We start from the transition
relation R of the process skeleton Sk from which we abstract.
Recall that (s, s′) ∈ R means that a process can go from s
to s′. From (10) and (13) we get that, FROM is the local state
of s, and TO is the local state of s′.
In the abstraction, if FROM 6= TO, a step from s to s′
is represented by increasing the counter at index TO by 1
and decreasing the one at FROM by 1. Otherwise, that is,
if FROM = TO, the counter of FROM should not change.
Here “increase” and “decrease” is performed using the cor-
responding functions over the abstract domain D̂, and the
mentioned updates of the counters are enforced in (16), (17),
and (15). Further, the counters of all local states different from
FROM and TO should not change, which we achieved by (18).
Performing such a transition should only be possible if there
is actually a process in state s, which means in the abstraction
that the corresponding counter is greater than I0. We enforce
this restriction by (12).
By the above, we abstract the transition with respect to local
states. However, s and s′ also contain the shared variables. We
have to make sure that the shared variables are updated in the
abstraction in the same way they are updated in the concrete
system, which is achieved in (11) and (14).
We thus arrive at the formal definition of the abstract
transition relation: RC consists of all pairs (w,w′) for which
there exist s and s′ in S, and FROM and TO in L such that
equations (9)–(18) hold:
(s, s′) ∈ R (9)
FROM ={sv}∪Λ s (10)
w =Γ s (11)
w.κ[FROM] 6= I0 (12)
TO ={sv}∪Λ s
′ (13)
w′ =Γ s
′ (14)
(TO = FROM) → w′.κ[FROM] = w.κ[FROM] (15)
(TO 6= FROM) →
(x = w.κ[TO], x′ = w′.κ[TO] |= αE({x
′ = x+ 1})) (16)
(TO 6= FROM) →
(x = w.κ[FROM], x′ = w′.κ[FROM] |=
αE({x
′ = x− 1})) (17)
∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ |L|.(ℓi 6= FROM ∧ ℓi 6= TO) →
w′.κ[ℓi] = w.κ[ℓi] (18)
APPENDIX D
DETAILED PROOFS
Simulation. In order to compare the behavior of system
instances we use the notion of simulation. Given two
Kripke structures M1 = (S1, S01 , R1,AP, λ1) and M2 =
(S2, S
0
2 , R2,AP, λ2), a relation H ⊆ S1 × S2 is a simulation
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qI
q1
q2
q3
q4
sv = V1
¬(sv = V1) inc nsnt
sv := SE
q5
q6
q7
qF
rcvd := ε where rcvd ≤ ε ∧ ε ≤ nsnt + fs
¬(ts + 1 ≤ rcvd)
ts + 1 ≤ rcvd
sv = V0
¬(sv = V0)
inc nsnt
sv := AC
qI
q1
q2
q3
q4
sv = V1
¬(sv = V1) inc nsnt
sv := SE
q5
q6
q7
q8
q9
qF
rcvd := ε where rcvd ≤ ε ∧ ε ≤ nsnt
¬(1 ≤ rcvd)
1 ≤ rcvd
sv = V0
¬(sv = V0)
inc nsnt
¬(to + 1 ≤ rcvd)
sv := SE
to + 1 ≤ rcvd
sv := AC
qI
q1
q2
q3
q4
sv = V1
¬(sv = V1) inc nsnt
sv := SE
q5
qF
rcvd := ε where rcvd ≤ ε ∧ ε ≤ nsnt
¬(n− t ≤ rcvd)
n− t ≤ rcvd
sv := AC
Fig. 5. Control flow automata for the steps of the FTDA from left to right tolerating symmetric faults, omission faults, and clean crashes; faults are modeled
by fairness constraints not shown.
relation with respect to a set of atomic propositions AP′ ⊆ AP
iff for every pair of states (s1, s2) ∈ H the following
conditions hold:
• λ1(s1) ∩ AP′ = λ2(s2) ∩ AP′
• for every state t1, with (s1, t1) ∈ R1, there is a state t2
with the property (s2, t2) ∈ R2 and (t1, t2) ∈ H .
If there is a simulation relation H on M1 and M2 such that,
for every initial state s01 ∈ S01 there is an initial state s02 ∈ S02
with the property (s01, s02) ∈ H , then we write M1  M2. In
this case we say M1 is simulated by M2.
A. The Proofs.
Proposition 11. For all p ∈ PRC and all a ∈ D:
ϑj(p) ≤ a iff Ij ≤ αp(a), and ϑj(p) > a iff Ij > αp(a).
Proof: Fix an arbitrary p ∈ PRC .
Case a ≥ ϑj(p). (⇒) Fix an arbitrary a ∈ D satisfying a ≥
ϑj(p). Let k be a maximum number such that a ≥ ϑk(p).
Then αp(a) = Ik. By Definition of αp we have k ≥ j and
thus, by Definition 10, Ik ≥ Ij . It immediately gives αp(a) ≥
Ij .
(⇐) Let a ∈ D be a value satisfying αp(a) ≥ Ij . There is
k such that αp(a) = Ik and a ≥ ϑk(p). From αp(a) ≥ Ij
it follows that Ik ≥ Ij and, by Definition 10, k ≥ j. Then
by Definition 8 we have ϑk(p) ≥ ϑj(p) and by transivity
a ≥ ϑj(p).
Case a < ϑj(p). (⇒) Fix an arbitrary a ∈ D satisfying a <
ϑj(p). Let k be a maximum number such that a ≥ ϑk(p).
Then αp(a) = Ik.
Consider the case when k ≥ j. By Definition 10 it implies
Ik ≥ Ij . It immediately gives αp(a) ≥ Ij , which contradicts
the assumption a < ϑj(p). Thus, the only case is k < j.
By Definition 10, k < j implies Ik ≤ Ij . As we excluded
the case k = j we have Ik ≤ Ij , Ik 6= Ij or, equivalently,
αp(a) = Ik < Ij .
(⇐) Let a ∈ D be a value satisfying αp(a) < Ij or,
equivalently, αp(a) ≤ Ij and αp(a) 6= Ij . There exists k such
that αp(a) = Ik and either (a) a < ϑk+1(p) or (b) k = µ.
From the assumption we have Ik ≤ Ij and Ik 6= Ij . From
this we conclude: (c) k 6= µ excluding (b); (d) Ik+1 ≤ Ij .
From (d) by Definition 10, k + 1 ≤ j. This implies by
Definition 8, ϑk+1(p) ≤ ϑj(p). From this and (a) we conclude
that a < ϑj(p).
Proposition 12. If Φ is a formula over variables x1, . . . , xk
over D, then ΦˆE is a PIA existential abstraction.
Proof: Consider an arbitrary d ∈ ||Φ||E . As d ∈ ||Φ||E ,
it satisfies the conjunct xˆ1 = dˆ1 ∧ · · · ∧ xˆk = dˆk and thus
satisfies the disjunction Φˆ, i.e. x = d |= ΦˆE . As d is chosen
arbitrarily, we conclude that ||Φ||E ⊆ {xˆ ∈ D̂k | xˆ |= ΦˆE}.
Theorem 16. For all p ∈ PRC , and for all CFA A, if
system instance Inst(p,Sk(A)) = (SI , S0I , RI ,AP, λI) and
system instance Inst(p,Skabs(A)) = (SIˆ , S0Iˆ , RIˆ ,AP, λIˆ),
then: if (σ, σ′) ∈ RI , then (h¯datp (σ), h¯datp (σ′)) ∈ RIˆ .
Proof: Let R and Rabs be the transition relations of
Sk(A) and Skabs(A) respectively. From (σ, σ′) ∈ RI and the
definition of Inst(p,Sk(A)) it follows that there is a process
index i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N(p) such that (σ[i], σ′[i]) ∈ R and other
processes do not change their local states.
Let v be a valuation of A. By the definition of Sk(A)
from (σ[i], σ′[i]) ∈ R we have that CFA A has a path
q1, g1, q2, . . . , qk such that q1 = qI , qk = qF and for
every guard gj it holds that v |= gj . Moreover, for any
x ∈ Π∪Λ∪Γ∪{sv} it holds v(x) = σ[i].x and v(x′) = σ′[i].x.
We choose the same path in abst(A) and construct the valu-
ation hdatp (v). From Theorem 14 we have that for every guard
gj it holds that hdatp (v) |= gj . Hence, the path q1, g1, q2, . . . , qk
is a path of CFA abst(A) as well.
By the definitions of hdatp and h¯datp we have that for every
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x ∈ Π ∪ Λ ∪ Γ ∪ {sv} it holds hdatp (v)(x) = h¯datp (σ)[i].x and
hdatp (v)(x
′) = h¯datp (σ
′)[i].x. By the definition of Skabs(A) it
immediately follows that (h¯datp (σ), h¯datp (σ′)) ∈ Rabs.
Finally, (h¯datp (σ), h¯datp (σ′)) ∈ Rabs implies that
(h¯datp (σ), h¯
dat
p (σ
′)) ∈ R
Iˆ
.
Theorem 18. Let π = {σi}i≥1 be a J-fair path of
Inst(p,Sk(A)). Then πˆ = {h¯datp (σi)}i≥1 is a J-fair path of
Inst(p,Skabs(A)).
Proof: By inductively applying Theorem 16 to π we
conclude that πˆ is indeed a path of Inst(p,Skabs(A)).
Fix an arbitrary justice constraint q ∈ J ⊆ APD; infinitely
many states on π are labelled with q. Fix a state σ on π with
q ∈ λI . We show that q ∈ λIˆ(h¯
dat
p (σ)). Consider two cases:
Case 1. Proposition q has a form [∃i. Φ(i)], where Φ
has free variables of two types: a vector of parameters
xp = xp1, . . . , x
p
|Π| from Π and a vector of variables x
v =
xv1 , . . . , x
v
k . There is a process index i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N(p) such
that σ[i] |= Φ(i). Hence, xp = p, xv1 = σ[i].x1, . . . , xvk =
σ[i].xk |= Φ(i). From the definition of the existential ap-
proximation it follows that (αp(σ[i].x1), . . . , αp(σ[i].xk)) ∈
||Φ(i)||E . Thus, xˆv1 = αp(σ[i].x1), . . . , xˆvk = αp(σ[i].xk) |=
αE(Φ(i)). As for every xj : 1 ≤ j ≤ k the value h¯datp (σ)[i].xj
is exactly xˆvj , we arrive at h¯datp (σ)[i] |= αE(Φ(i)). Then by
the construction of λ
Iˆ
it holds that [∃i. Φ(i)] ∈ λ
Iˆ
(h¯datp (σ)).
Case 2. Proposition q has a form [∀i. Φ(i)], where Φ
has free variables of two types: a vector of parameters
xp = xp1, . . . , x
p
|Π| from Π and a vector of variables x
v =
xv1 , . . . , x
v
k . Then for every process index i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N(p) it
holds σ[i] |= Φ(i). By fixing an arbitrary i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N(p)
and repeating exactly the same argument as in the Case 1, we
show that h¯datp (σ)[i] |= αE(Φ(i)). As i is chosen arbitrarily,
we conclude that
∧
1≤i≤N(p)
h¯datp (σ)[i] |= αE(Φ(i)). By the
construction of λ
Iˆ
it holds that [∀i. Φ(i)] ∈ λ
Iˆ
(h¯datp (s)).
From Cases 1 and 2 we conclude that q ∈ λ
Iˆ
(h¯datp (σ)).
As we chose σ to be an arbitrary state on π labelled with
q and we know that there are infinitely many such states
on π, we have shown that there are infinitely many states
h¯datp (σ) on πˆ labelled with q. Finally, as q was chosen to be
an arbitrary justice constraint from J , we conclude that every
justice constraint q ∈ J appears infinitely often on πˆ.
This proves that πˆ is a fair path.
Theorem 20. For all p ∈ PRC , and all finite state
process skeletons Sk, let system instance Inst(p,Sk) =
(SI , S
0
I , RI ,AP, λI), and C(Sk) = (SC, S0C, RC,AP, λC).
Then: if (σ, σ′) ∈ RI , then
(
h¯cntp (σ), h¯
cnt
p (σ
′)
)
∈ RC.
Proof: We have to show that if (σ, σ′) ∈ RI , then
w = h¯cntp (σ) and w′ = h¯cntp (σ′) satisfy (9) to (18. We first
note that as (σ, σ′) ∈ RI , it follows from the (MOVE) property
of transition relations that there is a process index i such
that (σ[i], σ′[i]) ∈ RI ; we will use the existence of i in the
following:
(9). Abbreviating s = σ[i] and s′ = σ′[i], (9) follows.
(10) and (13). Follows immediately from the definition of L.
(12). From the definition of h¯cntp it follows that w.κ[FROM] =
αp(K(σ, FROM)).
From the existence of the index i it follows that
K(σ, FROM) ≥ 1. Hence, we have K(σ, FROM) 6= 0 and from
the definition of αp it follows that αp(K(σ, FROM)) 6= 0.
From αp(1) = I1 and Definition 10 of total order we conclude
(12), i.e. αp(K(σ, FROM)) 6= I0.
(11) and (14). Follows immediately from the definition of h¯cntp .
(15). Since TO = FROM, it follows from (10) and (13) that
s ={sv}∪Λ s
′
. Thus the process with index i does not change its
local state. Moreover from the property (FRAME) of transition
relations, all processes other than i maintain their local state.
It follows that for all ℓ in L, K(σ, ℓ) = K(σ′, ℓ), and
further that αp(K(σ, ℓ)) = αp(K(σ′, ℓ)), and in particular
αp(K(σ, FROM)) = αp(K(σ′, FROM)). Then (15) follows
from the definition of h¯cntp .
(16) and (17). From the property (FRAME) of transition
relations, all processes other than i maintain their local state.
Since TO 6= FROM it follows that i changes it local state. It
follows that
K(σ′, TO) = K(σ, TO) + 1, (19)
K(σ′, FROM) = K(σ, FROM)− 1. (20)
From the definition of h¯cntp we have
w′.κ[TO] = αp(K(σ
′, TO)) and
w.κ[TO] = αp(K(σ, TO))
w′.κ[FROM] = αp(K(σ
′, FROM)) and
w.κ[FROM] = αp(K(σ, FROM))
From Proposition 9 follows that
K(σ′, TO) ∈ γp(w
′.κ[TO]) and
K(σ, TO) ∈ γp(w.κ[TO]) (21)
K(σ′, FROM) ∈ γp(w
′.κ[FROM]) and
K(σ, FROM) ∈ γp(w.κ[FROM]). (22)
Point (16) follows from (19), (21), and the definition of
existential abstraction αE , while (17) follows from (20), (22),
and the definition of existential abstraction αE .
(18). From property (FRAME) processes other than i do not
move. The move of process i does not change the number of
processes in states other than FROM and TO. Consequently,
for all local states ℓ different from FROM and TO it holds
that K(σ′, ℓ) = K(σ, ℓ). It follows that αp(K(σ′, ℓ)) =
αp(K(σ, ℓ)), and (18) follows from the definition of h¯cntp .
Theorem 21. For all p ∈ PRC , and for all finite state
process skeletons Sk, Inst(p,Sk)  C(Sk), w.r.t. APSV .
Proof: Due to Theorem 20, it is sufficient to show that if
a proposition p ∈ APSV holds in state σ of Inst(p,Sk) then
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it also holds in state h¯cntp (σ) and vice versa. We distinguish
two types of propositions.
If p = [∀i. svi = Z] and p ∈ λI(σ), then by the definition of
λI we have
∧
1≤i≤N(p) (σ[i].sv = Z). Thus, in global state σ
all processes are in a local state with sv = Z . In other words,
no process is in a local state with sv 6= Z . It follows that
each local state ℓ satisfies in σ that ℓ.sv = Z or K(σ, ℓ) = 0.
From the definition of h¯cntp and the definition of λC this case
follows. The same argument works in the opposite direction.
If p = [∃i. svi = Z] and p ∈ λI(σ), then by the definition of
λI we have
∨
1≤i≤N(p) (σ[i].sv = Z). Thus, in global state σ
there is a process in a local state ℓ with sv = Z . It follows that
K(σ, ℓ) > 0. From the definition of h¯cntp and the definition
of λC the case follows. The same argument works in the
opposite direction.
This two cases conclude the proof.
Theorem 22. If π = {σi}i≥1 is a J-fair path of Inst(p,Sk),
then the path πˆ = {h¯cntp (σi)}i≥1 is a J-fair path of C.
Proof: By inductively applying Theorem 20 to π we
conclude that πˆ is indeed a path of C.
Fix an arbitrary justice constraint q ∈ J ⊆ APD; infinitely
many states on π are labelled with q. Fix an arbitrary state σ
on π such that q ∈ λI . We show that q ∈ λC(h¯cntp (σ)).
Propositions from APD have the form of [∃i. Φ(i)] and
[∀i. Φ(i)], where each Φ(i) has free variables of two types:
a vector of parameters xp = xp1, . . . , x
p
|Π| from Π, a vector of
local variables xℓ = xℓ1, . . . , xℓk from Λ, and a vector of global
variables xg = xg1 , . . . , xgm from Γ.
[∃i. Φ(i)] ∈ λC(w) iff∨
ℓ∈L
(
xℓ = ℓ,xg =Γ w |= αE(Φ(i)) ∧ w.k[ℓ] 6= I0
) (23)
[∀i. Φ(i)] ∈ λC(w) iff∧
ℓ∈L
(
xℓ = ℓ,xg =Γ w |= αE(Φ(i)) ∨ w.k[ℓ] = I0
) (24)
Consider two cases: Existential case (23). There is a process
index i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N(p) such that σˆ[i] |= αE(Φ(i)).
Consider a local state ℓ ∈ L with ℓ =L σˆ[i]. As σˆ[i] |=
αE(Φ(i)) it follows that xℓ1 = ℓ.xℓ1, . . . , xℓk = ℓ.xℓk, x
g
1 =
w.xg1 , . . . , x
g
m = w.x
g
m |= αE(Φ(i)). As i is the index of a
process with ℓ =L σˆ[i], it immediately follows that K(w, ℓ) 6=
0. From the definition of α it follows that for every p ∈ PRC
it holds αp(K(w, ℓ)) 6= I0. Thus, by the definition of h¯cntp we
have w.κ[ℓ] 6= I0.
Hence, both requirements of equation (23) are met for ℓ and
from the property of disjunction we have q ∈ λC(w).
Universal case (24). Then for every process index i : 1 ≤ i ≤
N(p) it holds σˆ[i] |= αE(Φ(i)).
By fixing an arbitrary i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N(p), choosing ℓ ∈ L
with ℓ =L w and by repeating exactly the same argument as
in the existential case, we show that xℓ1 = ℓ.xℓ1, . . . , xℓk =
ℓ.xℓk, x
g
1 = w.x
g
1 , . . . , x
g
m = w.x
g
m |= αE(Φ(i)). Thus, for
every ℓ ∈ L such that there exists i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N(p) with
ℓ =L w the disjunct for ℓ in 24 holds true.
Consider ℓ′ ∈ L such that for every i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N(p)
it holds ℓ′ 6=L w. It immediately follows that K(w, ℓ′) = 0;
from the definition of αp we have that αp(K(w, ℓ′)) = I0
and thus κ[ℓ′] = I0. Then for ℓ′ the disjunct in 24 holds true
as well.
Thus, we conclude that the conjunction in the right-hand
side of the equation (24) holds, which immediately results in
q ∈ λC(w).
From Universal case and Existential Case we conclude that
q ∈ λC(w). As we chose σˆ to be an arbitrary state on π
labelled with q and we know that there are infinitely many
such states on π, we have shown that there are infinitely many
states h¯cntp (σˆ) on πˆ labelled with q. Finally, as q was chosen
to be an arbitrary justice constraint from J , we conclude that
every justice constraint q ∈ J appears infinitely often on πˆ.
This proves that πˆ is a fair path.
Theorem 28. Let T ⊆ RC be a set of spurious transitions.
Then for every transition (σ, σ′) ∈ Rω there is a transition
(h¯dc(σ), h¯dc(σ′)) in RC \ T .
Proof: Assume that there is transition (σ, σ′) ∈ Rω with
w = h¯dc(σ), w′ = h¯dc(σ′), and (w,w′) ∈ RC ∩ T . As T
is a set of uniformly spurious transitions, we have that the
transition (w,w′) is uniformly spurious. Consider a pair of
states ρ, ρ′ ∈ Sω with the property h¯dc(ρ) = w and h¯dc(ρ′) =
w′. From Definition 26 it follows that (ρ, ρ′) 6∈ Rω. This
contradicts the assumption (σ, σ′) ∈ Rω as we can take ρ = σ
and ρ′ = σ′.
Theorem 29. Let J ⊆ APD be a set of justice requirements,
q ∈ J , and U ⊆ SC be a set of unjust states under q. Let
π = {σi}i≥1 be an arbitrary fair path of Sysω under J . The
path πˆ = {h¯dc(σi)}i≥1 is a fair path in C(Skabs(A)) under
J ∪ {[off U ]}.
Proof: Consider an arbitrary fair path π = {σi}i≥1 of
Sysω under J . Assume that πˆ = {h¯dc(σi)}i≥1 is fair under
J , but it becomes unfair under J ∪ {[off U ]}.
If πˆ is unfair under {[off U ]}, then πˆ does not have
infinitely many states labelled with [off U ]. Thus, πˆ must
have an infinite suffix suf (πˆ), where each w ∈ suf (πˆ) has
the property [off U ] /∈ λC. From the definition of [off U ] we
immediately conclude that every state w ∈ suf (πˆ) belongs to
U , i.e., w is unjust under q ∈ J .
Using the suffix suf (πˆ) we reconstruct a corresponding
suffix suf (π) of π (by skipping the prefix of the same length as
in πˆ). From the fact that every state of suf (πˆ) is unjust under q
we know that every state σ ∈ suf (π) violates the constraint q
as well, namely, q 6∈ λω(σ). Thus, π has at most finitely many
states labelled with q ∈ J . It immediately follows from the
definition of fairness that π is not fair under J . This contradicts
the assumption of the theorem.
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APPENDIX E
SOUND REFINEMENT TECHNIQUES
A. Detecting Spurious Transitions and Unjust States
In this section we show symbolic techniques to detect
spurious transitions and unfair states for our specific PIA
abstractions. We are concerned with symbolic representations
that can be encoded as a formula of an SMT solver. While
there are systems where one can encode the monster system
Sysω (Section V) in an SMT solver [37], [45], it is not obvious
how to do this for threshold-based distributed algorithms,
which have a parameterized local state space.
Our method consists of using a model for refinement
that abstracts only local state space, but is finer than
{Inst(p,Skabs(A))}p∈PRC . Thus, we introduce a family
{Inst(p,SkΛ(A))}p∈PRC , where SkΛ(A) is a skeleton ob-
tained by applying a data abstraction similar to Section IV-B,
but shared variables Γ preserve their concrete values. Because
guards operate on variables both in the abstract and concrete
domain, we have to define a finer abstraction of guards.
We need some additional notation. In Section IV-A we
introduced set GA of linear combinations met in threshold
guards of CFA A. Let εi be such an expression that induces
the threshold function ϑj for 0 ≤ j ≤ µ. Note, that ε0 stands
for 0 and ε1 stands for 1. We construct a formula in(y, Ia)
expressing that a variable y lies within the interval captured
by Ia. (Note that parameter variables are free in the formula.)
in(y, Ia) ≡ (Ia = Iµ∧εa ≤ y) ∨ (Ia 6= Iµ∧εa ≤ y < εa+1)
The abstraction of CFA guards is defined in Figure 6.
Similarly to Section IV-B we construct a CFA abstΛ(A) and
then use a process skeleton SkΛ(A) induced by abstΛ(A). For
every parameter values p ∈ PRC one can construct an instance
Inst(p,SkΛ(A)) using SkΛ(A). We are going to show that
this abstraction is coarser than Inst(p,Sk(A)) and finer than
Inst(p,Skabs(A)) due to:
Proposition 31: Sk(A)  SkΛ(A)  Skabs(A).
Now we encode the whole family {Inst(p,SkΛ(A))}p∈PRC
using the VASS representation introduced in Section IV-C. A
global state of the system VSΛ is represented by a vector of
parameter values, a vector of shared variable values, and a
vector of process counters: (p,g,K), where p ∈ PRC , g ∈
D|Γ|, K ∈ N
|L|
0 . Moreover, N(p) =
∑
1≤i≤|L|Ki.
One can define a formula Init(p,g,K) that captures
the initial states (p,g,K) similarly to the initial states
of C(Skabs(A)).
VSΛ makes a step from a global state (p,g,K) to a global
state (p′,g′,K′) when:
• p′ = p;
• there is a step (s, s′) ∈ R of the skeleton SkΛ(A), where
a process moves from the local state FROM =Λ s to the
local state TO =Λ s′;
• at least one process stays in FROM, i.e. KFROM > 0;
• the counters are updated as K′FROM = K′FROM − 1 and
K′TO = K
′
TO + 1;
• other counters do not change values, i.e. ∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤
|L|. (i 6= FROM ∧ i 6= TO)→ K′i = Ki.
We can encode these constraints by a symbolic formula
Step(p,g,K,p′,g′,K′).
The function λVSΛ labels states with justice constraints
similar to the equations that define λC in Section IV-C. We
omit the formal definition here.
Proposition 32: System VSΛ simulates system Sysω.
This allows us to use the following strategy. We take a
transition τ of C(Skabs(A)) and try to replay it in VSΛ. If
τ is not reproducible in VSΛ, due to Proposition 28, τ is
a spurious transition in Sysω and it can be removed. The
following proposition provides us with a condition to check if
τ can be replayed in VSΛ:
Proposition 33: Let (w,w′) ∈ RC be a transition of
C(Skabs(A)). If there exists a transition (σ, σ′) ∈ Rω such
that w = h¯dc(σ) and w′ = h¯dc(σ′), then there exists
a transition Step(p,g,K,p,g′,K′) of VSΛ satisfying the
following condition:∧
1≤i≤|L|
(
in(Ki, w.κ[i]) ∧ in(K
′
i, w
′.κ[i])
)
∧
∧
1≤j≤|Γ|
(
in(gi, w.gj) ∧ in(g
′
j, w
′.gj)
)
In other words, if the formula from Proposition 34 is
unsatisfiable, the transition (w,w′) can be removed safely.
Further, we check whether an abstract state w ∈ SC is an
unjust one. If it is, then Proposition 33 allows us to refine
justice constraints. The following proposition provides us with
a condition that a state is unjust in VSΛ:
Proposition 34: Let w ∈ SC be a state of C(Skabs(A)) and
q ∈ APD be a proposition expressing a justice constraint. If
there exists a state σ ∈ Sω such that w = h¯dc(σ) and q ∈
λω(σ), then there exists a state (p,g,K) of VSΛ satisfying
the following condition:
q ∈ λVSΛ((p,g,K)) ∧∧
1≤i≤|L|
in(Ki, w.κ[i]) ∧
∧
1≤j≤|Γ|
in(gi, w.gj)
In other words, if the formula from Proposition 34 is
unsatisfiable, there is no state σ ∈ Sω with q ∈ λω(σ)
abstracted to w. Thus, w is unjust.
Remark 35: The system VSΛ and the constraints of Propo-
sitions 33 and 34 can be encoded in an SMT solver. By
checking satisfiability we detect spurious transitions and unjust
states. Moreover, unsatisfiable cores allow us to prune several
spurious transitions and unjust states at once.
B. Invariant Candidates Provided by the User
In the transition-based approach of the previous section we
cannot detect paths of being spurious in the case they do
not contain uniformly spurious transitions (cf. beginning of
Section V). In this case a human guidance might help: An
expert gives an invariant candidate. Assuming the invariant
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abstΛ(g) =

αE(g) if g is a threshold guard∨
(Ia,Ib)∈||g||E
xˆ = Ia ∧ in(y, Ib) if g is a comparison guard over x ∈ Λ, y ∈ Γ
g if g is either a comparison guard over x, y ∈ Γ or a status guard
abstΛ(g1) ∧ abstΛ(g2) if g is g1 ∧ g2
Fig. 6. The abstraction of local variables in CFA guards.
candidate is expressed as a formula Inv over a global state
(p,g,K) of VSΛ, the invariant candidate can be automatically
proven to indeed being an invariant by verifying satisfiability
of the formulas:
Init(p,g,K)→ Inv(p,g,K) (25)
Inv(p,g,K) ∧ Step(p,g,K,p,g′,K′)
→ Inv(p,g′,K′) (26)
Then a transition (w,w′) ∈ RC is spurious if the following
formula is not satisfiable:
Inv(p,g,K) ∧
Step(p,g,K,p,g′,K′) ∧ Inv(p,g′,K′) ∧∧
1≤i≤|L|
(
in(Ki, w.κ[i]) ∧ in(K
′
i, w
′.κ[i])
)
∧
∧
1≤j≤|Γ|
(
in(gi, w.gj) ∧ in(g
′
j, w
′.gj)
)
If we receive a counterexample Tˆ that cannot be refined
with the techniques from the previous section, we test each
transition of Tˆ against the above formula. If the formula is
unsatisfiable for a transition (w,w′) ∈ Tˆ , it is sound to remove
it from C(Skabs(A)) due to Theorem 28, Equations (25), (26),
and the formula above.
Example 36: To give an impression, how simple an in-
variant can be, for our case study (cf. Section II) the relay
specification required us to introduce the following invariant
candidate: If Ls = {ℓ ∈ L | ℓ.sv = SE ∨ ℓ.sv = AC},
then the following formula is an invariant nsnt =
∑
ℓ∈Ls
Kℓ.
Intuitively, it captures the obvious property that the number of
messages sent is equal to the number of processes that have
sent a message. This property was, however, lost in the course
of abstraction.
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